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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s concepts of being 
and time, the role of language in being, and ways of authentic being through the lens of 
modern media practices in the Information Age. It relates Heidegger’s philosophy to the 
media ecology theory introduced by Marshall McLuhan in the 1960s by exploring 
McLuhan’s themes of tribal, typographical and electronic man.  In addition, this thesis 
considers the role of mass media in information dissemination. 
The goal of this report is to explicate the shaping effects of mass media, 
especially social media, on individual perceptions and societal culture and identify ways 
in which such shaping affects authentic ways of being. 
 Keywords:  authenticity, social media, Information Age, language, media 
ecology 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his landmark work, Being in Time, twentieth century German philosopher 
Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976) concerned himself with the phenomenology of “Being.”  
Heidegger is often described as an existentialist, though he refused to be classified as 
such.  To Heidegger, “Being” is about more than existing; it’s about becoming one’s 
authentic self, “the person you always were,” and avoiding, to the extent possible, 
becoming mired in the “they self.”  Heidegger, much like Hegel before him, saw 
language as the medium for self-exploration and self-expression, a medium through 
which one achieves authenticity.  However, he viewed rapid twentieth century 
technological advances with a distrustful eye.  He anticipated technology’s ability to 
distract us from achieving authenticity while entrapping us in the “they self.”    
Though Heidegger was a brilliant philosopher, his concepts are among the most 
difficult to understand.  Fortunately, many scholars, like Dr. Michael Zimmerman 
(University of Colorado at Boulder), have delved deeply into his philosophy and 
discussed it extensively.  Zimmerman’s work, as well as that of many others, 
concentrates on Heidegger’s overall understanding of what it means to “Be.”  Though 
Heidegger wrote and lectured about language and technology, researchers have explored 
those concepts mostly through the lens of their relation to Heidegger’s ways of authentic 
being, or authenticity.  In this thesis, I will also view language and technology through 
the lens of authenticity and apply it to modern media practices. To do that, I will 
incorporate the thought of another twentieth century visionary, Marshall McLuhan. 
In the 1960s McLuhan (1911 – 1980), began blazing a trail into the relationship 
between media and message and their historical impact on culture.  He is famous for the 
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aphorism, “The medium is the message,” and he coined the expression “global village” 
long before digital media became the juggernaut it is today.  Like Heidegger, he saw very 
clear connections between technology and how we view ourselves and the world.  He 
extended the concept that communication media are environments in which human 
cultures are subtly “massaged” into shape, an idea that has come to be known as media 
ecology.  The “message” of the media, is the media itself, the influence it exerts on 
human behavior.   
Interest in McLuhan’s theories waned after about ten years.  However, in recent 
years, McLuhan’s concepts have regained popularity.  In light of advances in digital 
communication technology, media scholars have begun to reassess McLuhan’s visionary 
ideas prompting New York Times reporter, Alexander Stille, to write in October 2000:  
[I]n the last several years McLuhan has emerged from the dustbin of 
history to become a pop icon of the Internet age. Wired magazine lists him 
as its patron saint, a flurry of books with titles like ''Digital McLuhan'' 
present him in a new light, and a generation grappling with the 
transforming effects of cyberspace, cell phones and virtual reality has 
begun to see him not as out of date but ahead of his time (Stille). 
 In this paper, I will begin with an introduction to Martin Heidegger’s concepts of 
being and time, the role of language in being, and ways of authentic being.  Next, I will 
introduce Marshall McLuhan’s concepts of media as the message, tribal, typographic, and 
electric man, and cultural shaping by media environments.  Finally, I will marry 
McLuhan’s media ecology to Heidegger’s phenomenology by exploring how linguistic 
devices such as memes and sound bites used in mass and social media have morphed into 
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manipulative forms of cultural expression and how they distract us from achieving 
authenticity. 
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PART I.  THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER 
On Being and Time 
Anyone attempting to read Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, or any of his 
writings for that matter, quickly realizes that this philosopher has a unique relationship 
with language.   Introductions to English translations of his books often begin with 
discussions on the difficulty in translating them.  Gilbert Shaver, in his review of Albert 
Hofstader's translation, Martin Heidegger: Poetry, Language, Thought, says the problems 
faced by translators are "not merely formidable, they are outright Herculean...Heidegger 
forges language in a primal way" (Shaver 742).  Unraveling and adequately 
communicating the meanings of Heidegger's forged neologisms, like ownedness and 
throwness, or odd word combinations, like being-with, being-in, being–toward and being-
there, make translation even more daunting than the straightforward task of translating 
German into English.   Yet, Heidegger’s interest in language goes well beyond forging 
original and often perplexing idioms.    
Heidegger characterizes language as the “house of being,” an abode where being 
is disclosed and mysteries are protected.  Through his exploration of discourse, the basis 
upon which language is founded, Heidegger uncovers the difference between authentic 
and inauthentic language.  By virtue of this contrast, he suggests extremes of language.  
Despite his forward-thinking and somewhat prophetic distrust for rapidly developing 
technology, it is unlikely even Heidegger could have anticipated how extreme, perhaps to 
the point of perversion, contemporary discourse and language would become.  The 
advent of mass media, especially social media, opened avenues of discourse which have 
served to amplify inauthentic idle chatter and gossip, thus making it even more difficult 
5 
 
 
 
for Dasein to hear the silent call of conscience Heidegger says is necessary if Dasein is to 
turn from the inauthentic "they-self" toward a unique, individual, and authentic way of 
being. 
However, before we can address the relationship between language and being, we 
must first explore the fundamentals of Martin Heidegger's thinking.  Heidegger 
revolutionized Western philosophy when he introduced his method of phenomenological 
ontology in the early twentieth century.  In his seminal work, Being and Time, he argues 
that philosophy has historically, since the time of Plato and Aristotle, abandoned, 
forgotten, and, finally, trivialized and dismissed the most important question it should be 
asking:  the question of the meaning of being (Being and Time 1-3).   He does not 
concern himself with questioning the meaning of being in an abstract or metaphysical 
sense.  This, he claims, is the historical, traditional, and erroneous path upon which his 
predecessors strayed. Instead, he focuses on concrete ways in which Dasein, the being of 
human being, could manifestly be.   
Unlike Hegel, who devised an abstract dialectic method of subject-object conflict 
and resolution to achieve spiritual elevation toward the absolute, Heidegger espouses 
hermeneutics as a method of fundamental ontological analysis.   Lived-experience, being-
with others in the present, and the projection of future possibilities form an endless spiral 
of temporality by which Dasein gains concrete insights into the meaning of its own being 
and ways of being. To put it another way, Heidegger's focus is not on passive existence 
as such.  It is on actively existing. “Being-there,” which is the literal translation of Dasein, 
is a concrete, owned, active mode of existence which situates the self in a world, its own 
unique locus in place and time, and, thus, links being and time (Being and Time 14-17).   
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Because time is ecstatic, being is ecstatic.   But being is not just a series of nows.  
Temporal being, like hermeneutics, is recursive.  It involves a circling back from the 
pursuit of possibilities projected onto the horizon of the future to draw on lived 
experience upon which being is grounded, in order to understand and adapt to the 
situation in which Dasein finds itself in the present.  In this way, Dasein discloses itself to 
itself as itself and, in turn, illuminates new possibilities of being against the horizon of 
time. "Hermeneutics," says Heidegger, "works out the conditions of the possibility of 
every ontological investigation" (Being and Time 33).  By virtue of this hermeneutic 
circle of temporality, Dasein is always running ahead of itself or anticipating itself in its 
possibilities.  An analogy of this behavior can be seen in baseball when a runner on base 
leads off a few feet toward the next base in anticipation of the batter hitting a soon-to-be-
pitched ball.   It is important to understand, however, that Heidegger does not provide us 
with a "how-to" book in Being and Time, or, indeed, in any of his philosophical works.  
Instead, he prompts us to question the meaning of our own unique being so that we, in 
being, disclose to ourselves, as beings, individualized "ways" of being. 
 Hence, being is experienced in a very personal way.  As Heidegger says, "The 
being [Dasein] which this being is concerned about in its being is always my own...When 
we speak of Da-sein, we must always use the personal (his italics) pronoun along with 
whatever we say: 'I am,' 'You are.'"  Mineness and ownedness, then, become important 
components of being.  Both imply choosing.  Being is "mine" and, as such, I can choose 
ways to be.  As a result, I "own" the choices I make.  Of course, the existence of choices 
implies the existence of possibilities from which to choose. Among those is the 
possibility of choosing one's self.  "Da-sein is always essentially its possibility," says 
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Heidegger.  "It can (his italics) choose itself in its being..." Or not.  Heidegger identifies 
two kinds of existing:  authentic and inauthentic.  When Dasein chooses itself, or 
"belongs to itself," it is authentic (Being and Time 40).  Thus, authenticity occurs when 
Dasein chooses itself, when it chooses its own unique possibilities.  
 Most of the time, however, we are not concerned with choosing to be our 
authentic selves, though it does not necessarily follow that in not choosing authenticity 
we are defaulting to inauthenticity.  In fact, most of us have no conscious notion of the 
meaning of authentic or inauthentic existence, which pertain to Dasein's way of being.  
We are aware of our existence on what Heidegger refers to as a pre-philosophical level, 
but we rarely question the meaning of our existence in a concrete philosophical manner.  
Most of the time we are caught up in a mode of existence Heidegger calls 
"everydayness."  In everydayness, we attend to our personal needs and the needs of other 
entities and beings with which and with whom we interact.  We do the shopping, mow 
the lawn, have dinner with friends, feed the cat, and so on.  In this pre- philosophical 
everydayness, we are not usually attuned to being, as such.  We are most often attuned to 
what Heidegger calls the "they-self."   
 It might be said that we are born into the "they" in the sense that we are thrown 
into a world of being-with-one-another from birth.  But what is this nebulous "they" of 
which Heidegger speaks?  He labels it "the others" when he says: 
One belongs to the others oneself, and entrenches their power.  "The 
others," whom one designates as such in order to cover over one's own 
essential belonging to them, are those who are there (his italics) initially 
and for the most part in everyday being-with-one-another.  The who is not 
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this and not that one, not oneself and not some and not the sum of them all.  
The "who" is the neuter, the they (his italics) (Being and Time 118-19).  
The "they" has power over us, as Dasein, in that we become subservient to it.  We 
relinquish our own authentic ways of existing and choose ways that conform to standards 
set forth by the "they." We fail to consider the identity of the "they" of which we are not 
only members but also slaves.  Heidegger argues that the "they" is constituted by no one 
in particular and everyone in general.  This is what he means by "neuter."  When we say 
"they say..," we cannot name a particular individual.  When we say, "Everyone is doing 
or saying it," we cannot attribute what is done or said to anyone in particular.  Often, we 
hide within the anonymity of the "they."  In this way, we, as individuals, or as Dasein, 
take no responsibility for our choices; we become no one in particular and lose our 
individuality.  We assume the "they-self" and abandon ways of authentic existence. 
 Thus, the individual, as Dasein, becomes entangled in the "they," and manifests 
concern in maintaining that entanglement, even against its own interests.  This is 
evidenced by the way many individuals strive to achieve societal standards of wealth, 
power, or influence.  But even these standards are "leveled" or limited by the possibilities 
that anyone can achieve.  For example, "they" say, "Anyone can become rich in 
America."  This implies that the societal standard of wealth is achievable by anyone, 
everyone, and no one in particular.  Yet, societal standards do not include the ecstatic and 
dynamic possibilities of being that exist for an individual.  As part of the "they," Dasein's 
possibilities are limited to those which anyone, everyone, and no one in particular can 
accomplish.  Heidegger calls this "averageness," and describes it as "what is proper, what 
is allowed, and what is not...what is granted success and what is not" (Being and Time 
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119).   Oddly, Dasein finds refuge in receding into the "they."  If "they" always do it, then 
Dasein is disburdened from the responsibility of what is done.  The "they" caters to 
Dasein's "tendency to take things easily or make things easy" (Being and Time 120).   Of 
course, the very "easiness" of the "they" makes Dasein's task of disentanglement from it 
even more challenging.  Yet, only by turning from the "they," or by setting ourselves 
apart from it, can one begin the philosophical process of asking oneself what the meaning 
of being is for me.  Only then can one’s own unique possibilities be cleared or opened up 
against the horizon of time.  Only then can the truth of being be uncovered.  And only 
then can Dasein choose its own unique, authentic self over the "they-self."  According to 
Heidegger, this turn from the "they-self" toward authenticity is accomplished through and 
by language. 
On Being and Language  
 Discourse is how we, in being-with-one-another, share meaning.  As humans, we 
do this with language, particularly speech.  Language lets beings be seen in themselves as 
themselves.  Thus, language reveals the truth of being.  In his Letter on Humanism, 
Heidegger says “Language is the house of Being.  In its home man dwells” (217).    
Paradoxically, language also preserves the mystery of that which cannot be said.  
Heidegger posits that without a word to say it, a thing cannot be disclosed as itself in 
itself, and the would-be speaker is resigned to silence (The Nature of Language 62).  
Who has not groped for the right word or words to give expression to a thought only to 
give up in frustration?  But silence is not negative in itself because, for Heidegger, 
ordinary speaking can never fully accomplish the saying of truth.  Only poetry comes 
close - not because it says more, but because it says more while saying less.  In his 
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analysis of language, Heidegger is not as much concerned with poetic subject matter as 
he is with the way poets say, particularly through the use of metaphor, what cannot be put 
adequately into words.  He is not alone in understanding this paradox.  The British author 
Aldous Huxley once wrote: 
What a gulf between impression and expression! That’s our ironic fate—to 
have Shakespearean feelings and (unless by some billion-to-one chance 
we happen to be Shakespeare) to talk about them like automobile 
salesmen or teen-agers or college professors. We practice alchemy in 
reverse—touch gold and it turns into lead; touch the pure lyrics of 
experience, and they turn into the verbal equivalents of tripe and hogwash 
(Huxley 35-36).   
Here, in his own way, Huxley acknowledges the power of poetry to distinguish between 
saying and merely speaking.    Saying articulates meaning.  Speaking, on the other hand, 
may articulate meaning or it may merely produce the noise of gossip or idle chatter.  For 
this reason, Heidegger gives priority, instead, to hearing, to actively listening to that 
which is not said.   
 Listening proves more important to Heidegger because it makes possible the 
hearing of a voice within each of us that silently beckons us, as Dasein, to ourselves.  He 
refers to this voice as the "call of conscience," and characterizes it in this way: "The call 
is lacking any kind of utterance.  It does not even come to words, and yet it is not at all 
obscure and indefinite.  Conscience speaks constantly and solely in the mode of silence" 
(Being and Time 263).   Conversely, idle chatter and gossip are distracting and insidious 
constituents of language used by the "they" whereby:  
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...everyone keeps track of the other, initially and first of all, watching how 
he will behave, what he will say to something.  Being-with-one-another in 
the they is not at all a self-contained, indifferent side-by-sideness, but a 
tense, ambiguous keeping track of each other, a secretive, reciprocal 
listening-in.  Under the mask of the for-one-another, the against-one-
another is at play (Being and Time 163).     
As already discussed, the anonymity of the "they" makes it easy for Dasein to avoid 
taking responsibility for its own choices.  In doing so, Dasein "falls prey" to or is taken in 
by the world and falls away from itself (Being and Time 176).   Idle chatter, or gossip, 
contributes to falling prey by disclosing to Dasein a groundless way of being.  It is a way 
marked by a shallow curiosity for novelty rather than meaning or understanding and an 
ambiguity which makes it impossible "to decide what is disclosed in genuine 
understanding and what is not" (Being and Time 162)   Such ambiguity extends even to 
Dasein itself.  Hence, the noise of idle talk may distract Dasein from itself and its own 
authentic way of being.  In its distraction, Dasein may be lured into falling prey to the 
world and becoming entangled in it.  Over the din, the "call of conscience," in its silence, 
summons Dasein to choose itself. 
 In our culture, the word "conscience" often carries a connotation of guilt for some 
perceived wrong-doing.  For example, a contrite writer might say, "My conscience is 
bothering me," if she had plagiarized the work of another.  However, Heidegger does not 
connect "conscience" to guilt associated with wrong-doing.  Instead, he contends that our 
guilt is that of being thrown into the world, of having choices to make as a result of our 
throwness, and of having to accept responsibility for those choices.  Conscience, in this 
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sense, calls to us to take responsibility for our actions, to turn away from the concealing, 
anonymous refuge of the "they," and choose to be our own authentic selves (Schalow and 
Denker 85-86).  Conscience also calls us to attest to our ownmost possibility: death.  
With this attestation, we no longer live as if death happens to others and not to us.   We 
are released from fear and the fleeing from death that makes taking refuge in the "they" 
seem attractive.  Instead, we enjoy the freedom that comes with understanding and 
accepting that all our possibilities are limited by death.   We are free to choose individual 
ways of being that are informed by acknowledging our finitude (Being and Time 243-44).  
Therefore, language, spoken and unspoken, discloses to Dasein possible authentic and 
inauthentic ways of being.  We may choose to listen to the idle talk of the "they" and risk 
falling prey to the "they-self."  Or we may turn, instead, to the silent call of conscience 
and partake of the well-spring of self-disclosure that reveals the individual truth of being 
that is our own.  
Idle Talk Goes Viral 
 Martin Heidegger was born in Germany in 1889.  Over the course of his 86-year 
life, he witnessed enormous technological changes and social upheavals.  To a greater or 
lesser extent, he participated in both world wars.  His involvement with Nazism in the 
years preceding World War II embroiled him in a controversy which continues to color 
the way he is viewed, both as an individual and a philosopher.  Though he officially 
joined the Nazi Party on May 1, 1933, within a year he had resigned his politically 
connected position as Rector of the University of Freiburg and stopped attending party 
meetings.  The debate over his role in the party is fueled by his failure to submit a formal 
resignation from the Nazi Party and the conflicting interpretations of lectures he gave 
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before and after resigning his rectorate (Zimmerman 36-45).   But regardless of which 
side one takes, it seems clear that Heidegger, at least for a time, fell prey to the idle 
chatter and gossip of an era which produced Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime.   
 Perhaps one of the reasons Hitler's disastrous and maniacal message so effectively 
seduced his countrymen into the Nazi "they," possibly even Heidegger himself, was his 
inspired use of radio and a recent technological innovation - television.  As early as 1935, 
Hitler, the gifted rhetorician, saw the potential in television and used it to his advantage 
(Spiegel TV).   Heidegger, however, in his writings and lectures, views rapid 
technological advances with a wary eye.  The processes involved in technology, such as 
mass production, reduce humans to no more than cogs in the machine.  Furthermore, the 
products of technology are often only poor substitutes for what they replace.  Quantity is 
often given priority over quality.  And, in many cases, humans become slaves to the 
machines they create.  We see that today in our mobile phone culture, as Figure 1, taken 
from a Facebook newsfeed, depicts: 
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Figure 1:  Master/Slave Relationship with Technology 
. 
It is worth noting that the cartoon in Figure 1 received more than 49,000 likes and 1,400 
comments.  By definition, as discussed later in this paper, it had gone viral by the time 
the screen shot of it was made.  More to the point, however, is that in our entanglement 
with what Heidegger calls “machination” we indulge in “extreme…forgotteness of being” 
(Schalow and Denker 180).  Through machination, we fall prey to the “they.” 
Yet, despite Heidegger's anticipation of a society enslaved by its own technology, 
it is unlikely he foresaw the coming of the Information Age and the exaggeration of idle 
chatter and gossip that came with it.   
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PART II.  THE MEDIA ECOLOGY OF MARSHALL MCLUHAN 
The End of the World as We Know It 
About the time Martin Heidegger began dealing with the fallout of his ill-fated 
decision to join the Nazi party, Herbert Marshall McLuhan began studying English at 
Cambridge University in England.  Born in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada in 1911, 
McLuhan rose to fame in the 1960s with his highly-publicized, if not entirely original, 
theories about the connections between media and culture (Stahlman 5-6).  His books, 
The Gutenberg Galaxy, published in 1962, and Understanding Media: The Extensions of 
Man, published in 1964 quickly transported him from relative obscurity to stardom.   
Like Heidegger, McLuhan held prophetic views of the future.  His anticipated 
revolutions in communication technology and how they would shape our culture led him 
to coin the terms “the age of information” and “global village.” These may be terms we 
carelessly toss about today, but in the mid-1960s, they were visionary, leading many 
today to see him as “the oracle of the digital era” (Fishman 567).  Another uniquely 
McLuhan term that is more familiar to students of communication theory and, perhaps, 
most relevant to this discussion, is “the medium is the message.”  In Understanding 
Media, McLuhan argues that the machine itself (or medium in a whatever form it 
assumes) is important, not what man does with it, when he writes, “In terms of the ways 
in which the machine altered our relations to one another and to ourselves, it mattered not 
in the least whether it turned out cornflakes or Cadillacs” (7-8).  To McLuhan, a product 
delivered by means of a mechanical process and the content of a digitally delivered 
message are equally irrelevant.   What matters is the mode of delivery because the mode 
shapes the product or the message, and in doing so, shapes our culture.  Therefore, it is 
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the medium to which we should be paying attention, not the message the medium 
delivers. 
One of McLuhan’s favorite rhetorical devices is the pun, and he uses it in the title 
of his 1967 book, The Medium is the Massage.  In it, he expands on his medium as 
message theme by demonstrating the almost imperceptible “massaging” of culture into 
various shapes accomplished by media. He likens that massaging or shaping effect to 
parental influence when he says, “Character is no longer shaped by only two earnest, 
fumbling experts.  Now all the world’s a sage” (Massage 14).  In most cases, McLuhan 
puts a positive spin on the movement from a linear, typographical culture to an electric, 
graphical one. However, he did see some drawbacks as will be discussed further on. 
Perhaps the most influential scholar to affect McLuhan’s thinking was his 
colleague at the University of Toronto and fellow Canadian, Harold Innis.  In fact, in his 
introduction to Innis’s book, The Bias of Communication, McLuhan referred to his own 
book, The Gutenberg Galaxy, as but “a footnote to the observations of Innis” (ix). Innis 
preceded McLuhan in focusing attention on the relationship between media and culture 
with the publication of his books, The Bias of Communication and Empire and 
Communications, in the early 1950s.  He organized media/cultural connections along the 
lines of “orality, modes of inscription, and electronic means of relaying messages” (Babe, 
Innis, Environment 314).  McLuhan, similarly, identified three dominant modes of 
communication media, but he expanded his theory in a significantly different direction.  
While Innis concentrated on how society’s elite use media, particularly in the form of 
opinion, as a means of social control, McLuhan concentrated on sensory perception.  
Innis saw media as extensions of message senders.   McLuhan saw media as extensions 
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of message receivers.  The gist of his theory is that media “modify both individuals and 
cultures by reshaping ideas and perceptions, that media ‘massage’ users imperceptibly, 
and that culture has become a product or commodity” (Babe, McLuhan 247, 271-72).  
Culture, then, is the product of the media environment within which it is framed.  This 
particular view of McLuhan’s gave rise to the discipline known today as media ecology, 
the study of environments created by media and their relationships with the cultures cast 
within them.  McLuhan’s vision of a new electric or electronic (in today’s vernacular – 
digital) media environment included an upheaval in culture that would effectively end the 
world as it was known at the time.  Looking back on the advances in digital technology 
since the height of his popularity in the 1960s, it is easy to see why many now see him as 
almost clairvoyant.  But to understand how McLuhan’s theory relates to Heidegger’s, we 
must first examine it more closely. 
Tribal, Typographical, and Electronic Man 
Marshall McLuhan, like Heidegger, had a unique relationship with language.  He 
employed a “mosaic” approach to writing that involved the use of metaphors, symbols, 
archetype, cliché, and even myths, which he equates to pattern recognition in pre-literate 
man (Babe, McLuhan 251-55).  He challenges his readers to probe for layers of meaning 
and, especially, patterns.  The mosaic, or pattern recognition theme, figures 
predominantly in McLuhan’s theories about the past and the digital age in which we now 
live. 
Functionally, McLuhan viewed spoken language not only as an amplification of 
mental processes, but as a transportation medium, much like feet or wheels.  Language 
permits us to go from one thing to another with greater ease and much less involvement 
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(Babe, McLuhan 260-61).  As an extension of one’s feet and hands, language, as a 
medium, creates environments and shapes cultures.  For instance, in a pre-linguistic 
culture, communication might involve walking up to a person with whom one wishes to 
communicate and then indicating, by means of hand and body signals, the message one 
hopes to convey.  Language simplifies that process tremendously, creates a new 
environment, one that allows more physical distance between the subjects (as far as the 
voice will carry) and even eliminates the need for a direct line of sight between 
communicators. Suddenly, a culture that relies entirely on face-to-face interaction, is 
turned upside down.  There is a brief period of confusion, but, eventually, a transcendent 
link is found between the old means of communication and the new one - perhaps the 
combination of facial expression with speech.  That transcendent link alleviates the 
anxiety associated with change.  For those affected, a new, more distant and less involved 
communication environment reshapes their culture.  It is still one of physical closeness, 
but not quite as close as before.  And, as ideas are more quickly and easily exchanged, the 
behaviors they promote are more quickly and easily adopted.  Consider the simplicity of 
describing a hunting strategy and discussing its pros and cons rather than acting it out in a 
hunter-gatherer version of charades.  Simply being able to yell “Help!” when one is in 
danger and have someone else hear, understand, and respond is life-changing.  Curiously, 
after the initial confusion subsides and change responses become cultural routines, media 
(in this case, speech) is rarely perceived as the cultural shaper (McLuhan, Massage 84).  
The new medium, as an environment, is invisible to all but the most discerning.   
The introduction of spoken language, then, marks the first of the three major 
communication periods or environments identified by McLuhan, all achieved in a pattern 
19 
 
 
 
similar to the one described above. “Speech,” writes McLuhan, “acts to separate man 
from man and mankind from the cosmic unconscious” (Understanding Media 79-80).  
The upside of this, of course, is expediency.  But the downside, according to McLuhan is 
the loss of connection with the collective unconscious.  Like Heidegger, McLuhan 
appreciated silence and understood that much could be gleaned from what is not said.  He 
rhapsodizes about a “speechlessness that could confer a perpetuity of collective harmony 
and peace” (Understanding Media 80)”  Yet, for better or worse, consciousness and 
speech, which gives consciousness voice, are what distinguish us from lower animals. By 
speech, mankind is shaped into what McLuhan refers to as a tribal culture that is linked, 
in terms of human senses, to the ear.   
Sound is indiscriminate and unyielding.  It comes from all directions at once.  
“We can’t shut out sound automatically,” writes McLuhan.  “We simply are not equipped 
with earlids” (Massage 111).  Tribal man, overwhelmed by the constant onslaught of 
sounds, is forced to mythologize.  In The Gutenberg Galaxy, McLuhan describes myth as 
“a succinct statement of a complex social process” (25). Later, in The Medium is the 
Massage, he defines myth as “the mode of simultaneous awareness of a complex group 
of causes and effects” (114). In both descriptions, he infers the need for pattern 
recognition.  Though speech “separates man from mankind,” it also creates 
interdependencies. Spoken communication depends on individuals hearing each other.  
Thus, speech is space-binding, it brings people together.  Speech does not bind time, 
however, because as soon as a word is uttered, it flies through space and is gone.  Spoken 
words, says McLuhan, are “resonant, live, active, natural forces” (Gutenberg 19).  The 
only way to bind them to time is by rote memorization and ritual repetition. Gregorian 
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chants and modern-day advertising jingles are good examples of speech bound to time. 
Song lyrics that run through one’s head for hours on end are another.  In fact, many ritual 
recitations are sung.  Who in the United States did not learn their ABCs by singing the 
alphabet song?  In medieval times, monks delivered a great deal of the Catholic liturgy in 
plainsong.   
Tribal man’s world, then, is presented to him in a non-linear, multi-directional 
sensual bombardment.  His overloaded sensorium responds by seeking patterns rather 
than specific meanings.  He interacts with the world in a holistic, non-fragmented way.  
Time is less important to him than space, though the ability to bind words to time, to 
remember and repeat them, makes him a repository of knowledge and empowers him.  
His culture is communal and interdependent, and he who harnesses the magic of speech 
wields the power.  For pre-literate man, the speech-as-power brokers are tribal chieftains, 
shamans, or storytellers.  Priests and scribes supplant them as various forms of non-
typographical writing develop.  But communal tribal culture is overthrown with the 
arrival of independent typographic man. 
McLuhan traces the origins of typographic man to the development of the 
phonetic alphabet.  Before then, written communication took the form of hieroglyphs or 
ideograms that, like the myths of tribal man, synthesized several things at once into a 
recognizable pattern. McLuhan points to a modern example of this when he writes:  
Suppose that, instead of displaying the Stars and Stripes, we were to write 
the words “American flag” across a piece of cloth and display that.  While 
the symbols would convey the same meaning, the effect would be quite 
different.  To translate the rich visual mosaic of the Stars and Stripes into 
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written form would to deprive it of most of its qualities of corporate image 
and of experience, yet the abstract literal bond would remain much the 
same.  Perhaps this illustration will serve to suggest the change the tribal 
man experiences when he becomes literate (Understanding Media 82). 
Hieroglyphics, ideograms, and other symbolic writing forms do not impact the culture of 
tribal man the way the phonetic alphabet does.  Glyphs carved into stone, like rote 
memorization, are time-binding.  But they are also space-binding in that are heavy and 
cumbersome, and, generally, one must be within proximity of them to see them.  
Furthermore, since symbolic writing is difficult to understand, it must be read aloud to an 
assembly of listeners by priests or scribes who can decipher them.  Thus, pre-literate man 
remains tribal in culture, though his information-as-power-brokers shift from the tribal 
chieftain, shaman, or story-teller to the priestly or scribal classes. 
The phonetic alphabet, on the other hand, is a completely fragmented and 
fragmenting medium.  The Chinese ideogram is constructed of several symbols, each 
representing a simple object or concept, strategically assembled to convey a complex 
concept.  Taken alone, each component of the ideogram has meaning.  The phonetic 
alphabet has none of those characteristics.  Letters are simply meaningless components 
that, when arranged in particular linear configurations, form words.  Words, arranged 
linearly, form sentences, and so on.  Compared to hieroglyphs and ideograms, letters are 
virtual gymnasts capable of fluid movement and stunning linguistic contortions.  They 
are easily learned, easily stored and reproduced, and easily portable.  But, as 
demonstrated with the example of the American flag, what we gain in simplicity, 
portability and longevity, we lose in the synthesis of multiple sensory stimulation.  Linear 
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writing is a time-binding, visual medium.  It takes away tribal man’s ear and the 
temporary, multi-directional, space-binding mosaic of sound.  In place of an ear, tribal 
man receives an eye and the time-binding, portable, retrievable, fragmentary, and 
unidirectional linearity of writing. The change in medium, which speeds up exponentially 
with the invention of the Gutenberg press, reshapes tribal man’s culture.  Suddenly, the 
masses no longer need to depend on others to read aloud to them.  Tribal man now reads 
independently and develops an independent mindset.  The priests and scribes who 
regulated manuscript media before the invention of the printing press lose control of 
tribal man’s opinion, and, as Innis theorized, of tribal man himself.  He abandons tribal 
living and tribal thinking.  Tribal man becomes typographic man.   
McLuhan sees wins and losses for tribal man as he becomes typographic man in 
this new media environment.  “If Western literate man undergoes much dissociation of 
inner sensibility from his use of the alphabet, he also wins his personal freedom to 
dissociate himself from clan and family” (Understanding Media 88).  As typographic 
man’s culture conforms to this new fragmented and linear medium, his thinking is 
transformed from the mythic or mosaic to the linear or sequential.  Books become the 
first mass-produced commodity. Soon, other assembly lines form.  Euclidean space and 
linear time form the Kantian a priori grounds for rational categories of knowledge.  
Sequential, cause and effect, one-thing-at-a-time thinking and acting – a way of being 
McLuhan relates to Aristotle’s efficient cause (the production process) - takes hold of 
typographic man’s culture.  It contrasts sharply with tribal man’s culture of pattern 
recognition and holistic interpretation, which McLuhan relates to Aristotle’s formal cause 
(the form a thing takes) (Stahlman 10) (Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). 
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Typographic man may have obtained freedom of individual thought and expression, but 
McLuhan found it disappointing that typographic man also became so desensitized by 
linearity that he failed to see how it shaped his culture.  
Again, pattern recognition played a role in McLuhan’s thinking.  In a letter to his 
mother in 1935, he wrote, “You may know a thing by its fruits if you are silly enough or 
ignorant enough to wait that long” (Letters 75).  In other words, he believed by 
recognizing historical patterns, we may reasonably predict the outcome of current events, 
and he had little patience for those waiting around for empirical evidence.  This may 
account for the oracle-like predictions McLuhan made about electronic man.  It certainly 
accounts for much of the criticism lodged against him.   
Yet, despite his very unscientific, non-linear, mosaic mythologizing, McLuhan 
was clearly on to something.  These days, it is not uncommon to hear people say that we 
live in the Information Age.  A good case could be made that the information age began 
as soon as man had the ability to synthesize and communicate sensory input and thought.  
But McLuhan draws a distinction between the mechanized age, made possible by 
moveable type, and the information age, made possible by electronic information 
processing.  Books, representing “the first uniformly repeatable commodity, the first 
assembly-line, and the first mass-production” (Massage 124), were also among the first 
threatened with obsolescence by a new commodity that snubbed its nose at both space 
and time – digitized information.  As with books, all other products shaped or influenced 
by typography faced a similar possibility of outmodedness.   
Curiously, it was the telegraph that started what McLuhan calls a cultural 
implosion by which individuals and media “merge into an interdependent, simultaneous 
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system,” or a “global village” (Babe, McLuhan 263-64).  Consider the example of settlers 
spreading across the American west who no longer had to send letters by Pony Express 
or mail train.  Emergency messages, at least, could be sent via telegraph.  Soon, telephone, 
radio, television, and computers followed.  People became linked in ways similar to that 
of tribal man.  Messages could be “heard” instantly from around the globe.   
McLuhan provides an early example of electronic media shaping culture (in this 
case, military culture) in Understanding Media when he recalls a statement given during 
the Nuremberg trials after World War II.  Albert Speer, the German Armaments minister, 
credited electric media, such as the telephone, teleprinter, and wireless radio, with 
making it possible for “orders from the highest levels to be given direct to the lowest 
levels, where, on account of the absolute authority behind them, they were carried out 
uncritically…” (247).   The speed up of information via electronic media, predictably, 
upset the culture of typographic man.  As Speer’s testimony demonstrates, orders now go 
straight from the top to the bottom, circumscribing an obsolete linear sequence that 
involves carrying written or verbal orders by hand or mouth from headquarters through a 
series of intermediaries to the front lines.  Extrapolate that to manufacturing assembly 
lines where humans were soon replaced by robots, and the panic caused by digital media 
becomes easier to understand.  Typographic man lived in a culture of clock-watchers who 
measured productivity in discrete, sequential units of time.  Space became boundless as 
he extended himself further and further from the tribal core.  But when the explosively 
mechanized environment created by typography imploded on itself, space and time 
disintegrated.  The information age arrived bringing with it the end of life as 
typographical man had known it.  Electronic man was born. 
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Electronic man exists in a culture of what McLuhan calls “allatonceness.” If life 
for typographic man was one of action (inventing, manufacturing, and marketing), life for 
electronic man is one of reaction to a constant, overwhelming barrage of information. “At 
the high speeds of electric communication,” McLuhan writes, “purely visual means of 
apprehending the world are no longer possible; they are just too slow to be relevant or 
effective…Our electrically-configured world has forced us to move from the habit of data 
classification to the mode of pattern recognition” (Massage 63).  Media ecologist and 
fellow Canadian Robert Babe interpreted McLuhan’s theory this way: “With information 
overload, old strategies for attaining knowledge and making sense of the world – 
isolating a structure or institution, studying it in detail, and making logical or causal 
connections among its parts – no longer suffice…the receiver must…adopt once more 
mythic modes of understanding and…creat[e] mosaics from unrelated bits” (McLuhan 
264).  This makes electronic man more akin to tribal man than typographic man.  Once 
again, man is plugged into the collective unconscious.  But what has he given up in 
return?  And, if the medium is the message, what message is this medium sending? 
Is Seeing Really Believing? 
Forty years have passed since Marshall McLuhan’s star rose and thirty have 
passed since it sunk once more into oblivion.  In that time, much of what he predicted has 
come to pass.  We now live in a global village shaped by digital media in a time known 
as the Information Age.  We can communicate instantly with almost anyone almost 
anywhere at almost any time.  And we are constantly bombarded with information via 
numerous electronic sources – television, radio, and most pervasively, the internet.  Not 
only are we receivers of information, we are senders.  Digital media, as McLuhan 
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expected, “demands participation and involvement in depth of the whole being” 
(Massage 125).  Yet, despite being an aural media which enables us to “hear” each other 
from across the globe, digital media is mostly graphic or visual.  McLuhan explains this 
by saying, “Most people find it difficult to understand purely verbal concepts.  They 
suspect the ear; they don’t trust it.  In general we feel more secure when things are visible, 
when we can ‘see for ourselves.’ We admonish children, for instance, to believe only half 
of what they see, and nothing of what they hear” (italics his) (Massage 117). But the 
question, when it comes to digital media, is can we even believe what we see?   
Information, like cars, televisions, computers, and smart phones, is a commodity 
to be bought and sold.  Innis warned that “any medium that predominates in a society at a 
given time is controlled by that society’s elite...who frame and enforce…laws, who 
engage in and control markets and the price system, who advertise, and who educate for 
the exigencies of ever-changing job markets.”  And how do they do this?  Not by force, 
but by exercising control over people’s thoughts and perceptions through promoting 
various opinions. (Babe, Innis, Environment 315).  Even McLuhan admitted that the 
power of media is not in the content, but in its ability to control people’s behavior.  In 
fact, he likened media content to a juicy piece of meat carried by a burglar to distract a 
watchdog.  He felt most people are oblivious to the way media “massages” their opinions 
and perceptions because they are so easily distracted by inflammatory or gratuitous 
content (Babe, McLuhan 264-65).  About the global village, he warned in an interview, 
“The global village absolutely insures maximal disagreement on all points.  It never 
occurred to me that uniformity and tranquility were the properties of the global village.  It 
has more spite and envy” (Babe, McLuhan 256).  Most damning was his admonition to 
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his son to limit the amount of time his granddaughter spent watching television, which he 
called a “vile drug” (Babe, McLuhan 270).  Clearly, he saw dangers in electronic media. 
The paradox of Marshall McLuhan is that he also envisioned great things for the 
Information Age.  He described it as a “time to use not a single, but multiple methods of 
exploration” (Massage 69).  He imagined it as a time of re-tribalization, hearkening back 
to the days when priests and scribes read manuscripts aloud to parishioners and all the 
human senses were in balance (Babe, McLuhan 255).   He hoped for harmony and peace. 
How can this apparent equivocation on his part be explained?  If there is one 
unifying statement of McLuhan’s view of the future it’s this:  “We shape our tools,” he 
said, “and thereafter our tools shape us” (Understanding Media xi).  For better or worse, 
according to McLuhan, we are the servomotors of whatever we invent.  In this regard, he 
and Heidegger shared the same view. 
Figure 2:  Master/Slave Relationship with Technology 
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PART III.  PHILOSOPHY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
Social Media:  Where the Global Village Meets 
McLuhan foresaw a global village, but social media, as it now exists, was not part 
of his explicit vision.  Yet, social media has become the gathering place of the global 
village, and it exhibits characteristics anticipated by Innis, McLuhan, and Heidegger.  
There are “maximal disagreement on all points,” and precious little “uniformity or 
tranquility.” Cyberbullying carries “spite and envy” to the extreme.  Those opinions Innis 
wrote about are everywhere, and Heidegger’s idle talk and gossip are rampant. They can 
be seen in “mean tweets” that proliferate on Twitter and in Instagrams that can be 
instantly erased and yet still remain in memory.   But perhaps no other social networking 
site represents this media ecology better than Facebook. 
 In a review of its results for the second quarter of 2013, Facebook reports 728 
million active daily users and 1.19 billion active monthly users as of September 30, 2013.  
Further, the company reports that when it introduced the ability to upload images from 
Instagram, 5 million videos were uploaded in the first 24 hours (Facebook).   The 
implications of these numbers are staggering.  One article, video, meme, event, or other 
item posted on Facebook has the potential to reach 728 million people in one day.  When 
any of these posts results in thousands, tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands 
of likes, shares, and comments, it is said to have "gone viral."  The website, Urban 
Dictionary, defines viral as "a website or video that has become instantly famous 
overnight via YouTube or other popular media."  However, it is worth noting that viral, 
in this sense, derives from the term "viral marketing," which Urban Dictionary further 
defines as "an online marketing strategy that encourages people to pass on a marketing 
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message" (Urban Dictionary).  So, in the Information Age, we are playing a global 
internet version of the children's game "pass it on," often at the bidding of marketers or 
others with their own agendas, just as Innis warned. Messages, often shaped by their 
originators to elicit certain behaviors from those who receive them, are "whispered" into 
the ears of those nearest them, who in turn "whisper" it to those nearest them, and so on.  
And like the children's game, the resultant message may or may not bear any resemblance 
to the original.  The content of these messages is often inflammatory, extreme, or obscene 
as evidenced by Figures 3 and 4 below, both of which are memes taken directly from a 
Facebook newsfeed: 
Figure 3:  Pro-gun Meme 
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Figure 4:  Anti-Boehner Meme 
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Often the content is blatantly false, as in this article, linked to a Facebook newsfeed, 
which "satirically" suggests Dearborn, Michigan has adopted Sharia Law ( National 
Report): 
Figure 5: Sharia Law Satirical Hoax 
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Sooner or later, many readers realized this was a hoax.  However, many others did not, as 
evidenced by their responses seen in Figure 6 ( National Report). 
Figure 6:  Response to Sharia Law Hoax 
 
 
McLuhan would argue that the messages contained in these memes, and indeed in 
television and radio sound bites, or any form of mass media is of lesser importance than 
the overall affects they produce.  Innis, who was more politically oriented than McLuhan, 
believed those who control the dominant media also control society.  Though power and 
control was not one of McLuhan’s central themes, it can be inferred from his culture 
34 
 
 
 
shaping motif.  Occasionally, though, he was explicit in the controlling factors of media 
as in this passage from Understanding Media:  “Ads seem to work on the very advanced 
principle that a small pellet or pattern in a noisy, redundant barrage of repetition will 
gradually assert itself.  Ads push the principle of noise all the way to the plateau of 
persuasion.  They are quite in accord with the procedures of brain-washing” (227).  The 
examples above are all advertisements of a sort.  They clearly promote agendas, though 
exactly what those agendas may be is far from clear.  On the surface each seems to be 
touting some political or ideological opinion.  But, since the originators of these 
messages are unknown, it is impossible to know their aim in launching the messages into 
cyberspace.  For example, is the purpose of the meme involving House Speaker John 
Boehner meant simply to attack him politically, or did the originator send it to perpetuate 
the friction between members of the various political parties?  If so, why?  These are 
questions many fail to ask before simply hitting the like button, commenting, or sharing 
the message with others. 
 Some may argue that "political cartoons" and similar satire have been around for 
years.  This is true.  However, the possible reach of a political cartoon, like the example 
in Figure 7 below from 1937, was limited to the number of people who read the 
newspaper.  Furthermore, the identity of the cartoonist and the publisher's agenda in 
printing it were easier to ascertain (American Studies @ University of Virginia).   
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Figure 7: 1937 Political Cartoon 
 
This contrasts greatly with the ambiguity and the secrecy (two elements identified by 
Heidegger as constituent of idle talk and gossip) that underlie messages promulgated by 
modern social media, not to mention the potential such messages have of "going viral." 
 But attention-grabbing messages like those above may actually be less distracting 
because of their obviousness than others which seem relatively benign but have built-in 
social conformity triggers.  Consider the screenshot taken from Facebook shown in 
Figure 8 below. 
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Figure 8:  Facebook Behavior Shaping Meme 
 
Language like this exemplifies McLuhan’s notion that “all people are involved in all 
others at all times” (Understanding Media 173) and Heidegger's definition of idle talk 
when he says, "everyone keeps track of the other, initially and first of all, watching how 
he will behave, what he will say to something...  Under the mask of the for-one-another, 
the against-one-another is at play" (Being and Time 163)   Posts of this nature are public 
and others, the "they," see whether or not the receiver conforms. Therefore, the receiver 
of this message feels pressured to perform the "suggested" action.  Such pressure results 
in the leveling or "averageness" Heidegger describes as doing "what is proper, what is 
allowed, and what is not...what is granted success and what is not" (Being and Time 119).   
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Though less obvious, these subtle messages are deceptively adroit at drawing individuals 
into the fold of the "they."  Some may argue, however, that all the examples above 
represent only a portion of the information shared on Facebook and other social 
networking sites, and that most of the items posted are innocuous bits of personal 
information shared among "friends." 
 It is true we live in a world with others and we regularly interact with them, either 
by necessity or choice.  In our being-with others, they disclose themselves to us as 
themselves.  We, likewise, disclose ourselves.  Verbal and non-verbal language makes 
such disclosure possible.  Yet, Heidegger tells us language also safeguards mysteries, that 
which is not said.  And for all the trivial things posted on Facebook and other social 
networking sites, much is not said.  This phenomenon takes the form of self-presentation, 
in which "some users may be more inclined to present themselves in a selective manner, 
highlighting the ‘favorable and appropriate images’ of themselves..." (Kim and Lee 360)  
In other words, we show people our best, happiest sides on Facebook and conceal the less 
favorable aspects of our lives.  While there is nothing wrong or new in this, per se, it is 
significant that social networking removes the subtle cues of voice inflection and body 
language often possible in face-to-face communication, cues that contribute to disclosure.  
In addition, self-presentation activities may contribute to envy and low self-esteem in 
others.  A study conducted at Utah Valley University found that "looking at happy 
pictures of others on Facebook gives people an impression that others are ‘always’ happy 
and having good lives...in contrast to their own experiences of life events, which are not 
always positive, [and that] people are very likely to conclude that others have better lives 
than themselves and that life is not fair” (Chou and Edge 149).   Conversely, some people 
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derive happiness and increased subjective self-worth by comparing the number of 
"friends" they have with the number of "friends" others have (Kim and Lee 365).   Thus, 
Dasein becomes entangled in the "they" by seeking social validation.  Ironically, these 
simple, everyday self-presentation interactions, in which we share vacation photos, birth 
announcements, or what we ate for dinner, are possibly the most treacherous.   Facebook, 
and similar social networking sites, provide global platforms to engage in exactly the 
“ambiguous keeping track of each other” and the “secretive, reciprocal listening-in” 
Heidegger associates with inauthenticity. 
What about the Harmony? 
McLuhan, despite his misgivings, dreamed of good things coming out of the 
Information Age – like sharing useful information and new ideas, and tapping into the 
silence of the collective unconscious where pattern recognition involves using all the 
senses.  He envisioned balance.  And, indeed, there are some great things about our 
electronic world.  For example, many of the sources used to write this paper were not 
locally available and were accessed remotely and relatively quickly via internet 
technology.   
On a grander scale, over the past few years social media and mobile applications 
(commonly called “apps”) installed on telephones and other mobile devices have become 
increasingly useful in relaying information during times of disaster.  A 2012 study 
conducted by the American Red Cross found that social media and mobile apps are tied 
for fourth place behind television, radio, and internet news outlets for disaster 
information sending and receiving.  All five forms of media, incidentally, are electronic 
or digital.  Print media is conspicuous by its absence in this list. 
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Figure 9: Reliance on Mobile Apps in Disasters 
 
The study also revealed that: 
• Emergency social users are also most likely to seek and share 
information during emergencies. While they look for the hard 
facts—road closures, damage reports and weather conditions—
they share personal information about their safety statuses and 
how they are feeling. 
• Three out of four Americans (76 percent) expect help in less 
than three hours of posting a request on social media, up from 
68 percent last year. 
• Forty percent of those surveyed said they would use social 
tools to tell others they are safe, up from 24 percent last year 
(American Red Cross). 
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Digital media is also gaining popularity in the search for missing persons. When a 
University of New Orleans student went missing recently, Facebook and Twitter went 
viral with photos and pleas posted by friends, family, fellow students, the university, and 
local news media asking for help in locating her. 
Figure 10: Facebook Post about Missing UNO Student 
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Figure 11:  UNO Tweets about Missing Student 
 
Sadly, she was found in her submerged car four days after she disappeared, the apparent 
victim of a driving accident. Yet, she may not have been located so quickly or at all 
without the aid of social media, online news media, television, and radio.  A report on a 
local television station’s website highlights the role played by social media in the search: 
More than a hundred people met Wednesday in Slidell to organize the foot 
portion of the search, which went five miles in every direction from the 
cell tower.  NOPD and St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office detectives 
were in the area of Highway 11.  Boats and a helicopter from St. 
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Tammany Parish were also in the water and air, as they have been since 
Sunday.  Family and friends said the turnout to search and spread the word 
on social media had been encouraging. The hashtag “#FindHaley” was 
created to foster help in the search via Twitter (Rodrigue). 
Yet, there are downsides even to these uses of high speed communication. 
A 2011 study performed on behalf of the United States Congress acknowledged 
potential and already realized benefits of using digital media in disaster situations.  The 
study also identified some troubling drawbacks.  For instance, social media was used 
heavily in efforts to locate missing persons just after a massive earthquake off the coast 
of Japan in March 2011 sent a devastating tsunami ashore there.  However, the study 
showed that tweets about many missing persons continued to be retweeted even after 
those individuals had been rescued.  Confusion caused by misinformation such as this can 
tie up valuable resources and put the lives of first responders at risk.  An even greater risk 
to first responders is the possibility of malicious use of social media by terrorists who 
might circulate fictitious reports of a secondary attack after an initial attack.  “Social 
media could be used as a tool for such purposes by issuing calls for assistance to an area, 
or notifying officials of a false hazard or threat that requires a response” (Lindsay 9-10).  
The anonymous, tribal, “pass the word” social media environment makes such possibility 
a distinct threat. 
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PART IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
A Retrieval of McLuhan’s Vision 
Clearly, digital media has changed our world.  Time and space have shattered as 
images and sound bites pour into our senses from our phones, televisions, computers, and 
radios in an overwhelming flood from around the world all day, every day.  Past and 
future are awash in a sea of “nows.”  If McLuhan was right, we are at risk of being 
diverted by this inundation of meaningless information - the juicy piece of meat that 
distracts the watchdogs of our minds - from media’s real message:  Mass media are 
subtly “massaging” our culture and reshaping the way we view ourselves and the world.  
If Innis was right, we are at risk of blithely ignoring how the media elite, modern-day 
power brokers, use opinion to coerce us into desired behaviors.  And, perhaps worst of all, 
we are at risk, as Heidegger warns, of becoming so caught up in the idle chatter - the 
gossip, rumor, opinion, and noise - of the “they” self that we cannot hear the silent call of 
conscience. 
A Retrieval of the Question of the Meaning of Being 
As stated previously, Heidegger does not provide us with a “how-to book” in 
Being and Time.  Throughout that book, and, indeed, throughout his entire oeuvre, he 
prompts us to question the meaning of being in terms of our own unique possibilities.  
Yet, he admonishes this is not an easy task.  “Truth (discoveredness),” he says, must 
always first be wrested from beings.  Beings are torn from concealment.”  Further, he 
warns, “Da-sein must explicitly and essentially appropriate what has also already been 
discovered, defend it against (his italics) illusion and distortion, and ensure itself of its 
discoveredness again and again” (Being and Time 204).  Thus, questioning the meaning 
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of being is not a “one and done” proposition.  It is a hard-fought battle that requires us to 
repeatedly defend against illusion, distortion, and reconcealment of the truth of being. 
As being-in-the-world, we desire and need social interactions with others, and in 
the Information Age, this often means exposure to questionable digital media.  But must 
Dasein be overwhelmed by the viral nature of social networking?  Must it be drowned out 
by voices that spew extremes in illusory or distorting language?  Must it be cleverly 
induced to listen-in to the chatter of others, contribute with self-promoting chatter of its 
own, or be pressured into actions of conformity with the “they”?  Can Dasein turn away 
from so much “noise” and toward the silent call of conscience?  As we have seen, even 
Heidegger fell prey to the “they” for a least a short time in his life.  And McLuhan 
demonstrated a love/hate relationship with his vision of the future. 
Heidegger responded to uncertainty by applying hermeneutics to his own life, by 
re-asking the question of the meaning of being for himself, time and again, as when he 
undertook thinking about technology and art, particularly poetry.  He acknowledged the 
possible benefits of technology, but he also anticipated its possible drawbacks.  In poetry, 
however, he may have identified the impetus for continued self-questioning:  mystery.   
In his poem, The Thinker as Poet, he writes: 
Thinking’s saying would be stilled in 
its being only by becoming unable 
to say that which must remain 
unspoken. 
Such inability would bring thinking 
face to face with its matter. (The Floating Library) 
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What is not said, what is silent, is a mystery that brings us face to face with Dasein.  In 
the end, curiosity that goes beyond the superficial and the desire to overcome Dasein’s 
own ambiguity may call louder than any carefully crafted message transmitted via 
modern communication technology. 
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